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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D C. 20301

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.6

NND 932015

By MR/EC Date 9/3/96

There are five purposes for which we might want to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). They are:

1. To protect against a Communist Chinese missile attack.
2. To protect against an accidental missile launching.
3. To protect against "nuclear blackmail," which could take the form of a light attack on a single target of moderate value.
4. To help protect our land-based strategic offensive forces.
5. To protect our cities against a large Soviet missile attack.

Today there are three options open to you.

- a. Do nothing at this time except continue a vigorous research and development program.
- b. Deploy a "thin" ABM system, which would meet Items 1 through 4 above.
- c. Deploy a "thick" ABM system, which would meet Items 1 through 4 and would, in addition, give local protection to 25 selected cities. This option is recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I will discuss each one of these options briefly.

a. The arguments in favor of Option a are: 1) it is unnecessary now to deploy a system against the Chinese threat because they are 8 to 9 years away from having any significant ICBM capability; 2) we have such missile superiority over the Soviet Union with our Polaris submarines which are essentially invulnerable, and our penetration aids for both sea and hardened land-based missiles, that it is unnecessary to protect our land-based strategic forces with an ABM; 3) the chance of an accidental missile launching is remote; 4) a blackmail

aids for both sea and hardened land-based missiles, that it is unneces-

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attack is unlikely, because an attacker would know that he was risking all-out nuclear war which would destroy his country; 5) a system designed to protect our cities would ultimately leave us in essentially the same position as we are now vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, because they would be forced to react to preserve their assured destruction capability. In the end, each would have the capacity to kill 70 or more million in the other's homeland, and we would have wasted \$30 to \$40 billion.

It has been argued that one need only expend about \$10 billion to deploy a system which would give protection to 25 selected cities. This argument, however, ignores the fact that if we were to deploy such a system, the Soviet Union would be forced to take countermeasures in the same fashion as we have done. This would require us to thicken our system to meet such countermeasures. In the end, our commitment to defend our cities would force us into deployment of a very thick system at a total cost of between \$30 and \$40 billion.

Further, if we were to deploy a system protecting only 25 cities, the pressures in the Congress would be tremendous to extend such a system to protect other population centers not covered by the \$10 billion system.

Finally, there are still difficult technical problems remaining to be solved, such as the development of the extended range Spartan missile and its associated six megaton warhead required for exo-atmospheric intercept, the development of the high acceleration Sprint missile for local defense, the development of the very complex radars, and the integration of all of these into a reliable system.

The argument against this option is the probable attitude of the Congress and our people. The first reaction of most Americans will inevitably be in favor of an immediate start on deployment, if for no other reason than the Soviets are deploying an ABM system.

b. The second option, i. e., to deploy a "thin" system, would meet the first four objectives listed in the first paragraph of this memorandum, probably at a cost of between \$4 and \$5 billion. It would have to be made clear that this system would not be expanded to attempt to protect our cities against a heavy Soviet attack. This system would not only meet the first four objectives but, for a limited period of time, would also have the side benefit of reducing population

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losses in the United States against a Soviet attack by 20 or 30 million. This benefit would disappear in time as the Soviets improved their missiles - as we have done - by the development of penetration aids and multiple warheads. If this option were chosen, the deployment decision could be coupled with talks with the Soviet Union, seeking to reach an understanding with respect to the further deployment of both ABM's and offensive missiles. A decision in favor of this option would draw the teeth of much of the argument that the Soviets have a defense and we do not. However, there would be continuing pressures from some sources to expand to a "thick" system.

c. The third option would, as indicated above, deploy a system designed to meet the first four objectives and to protect 25 selected cities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that you decide in favor of this option. For the reasons given above, this would not produce a stable situation because the Soviet Union would be forced to react and thus would negate the effectiveness of the system. In the end, we would spend \$30 to \$40 billion in thickening this system, and would not be able to protect our country from devastation from a Soviet missile attack.

The Congress is divided on the issue of deploying an ABM system, but we believe that a substantial majority favor going ahead with some form of deployment. The group in favor of proceeding with an ABM deployment is led by Senator Russell and has strong backing in the Armed Services Committees of both Houses:

<sup>signed</sup>  
CYRUS L. VANCE

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STATEMENT BY  
GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER, USA  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
ON THURSDAY, 2 MARCH 1967

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee, to discuss with you the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the deployment of the NIKE-X anti-ballistic missile system, and to develop the rationale behind the Chiefs' views on this subject. By way of prelude, let me affirm that the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agree in recommending we should proceed now to deploy NIKE-X.

Last year during formulation of the FY 67 budget the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deployment of NIKE-X. We recommended a deployment essentially the same as the Posture A deployment, outlined by the Secretary in his statement -- an area defense of much of the country, with defense also of 25 of the highest density populated areas.

We made this recommendation for two reasons. First, we had continued to watch the growing Soviet ability to destroy our population and our industry, and second, the research and development program on NIKE-X had reached a point where we felt that the NIKE-X was ready for deployment.

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By MR *ec* Date 9/3/96

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Now, what is the situation that we are facing today?

In the last year the intelligence community has noted that the Soviets are deploying an ABM system around Moscow, with another possible ABM system in other parts of the USSR.

I would like to emphasize to the committee that there is no divergency of view within the intelligence community as to the purpose of the Moscow deployment. Unanimously, they agree that this is an anti-ballistic missile system.

There is some divergency of view as to the second system, the so-called TALLINN system, which is deployed across the northeastern part of the Soviet Union. Some say that the TALLINN system is primarily devoted to defense against high flying air breathing objects. Some go so far as to say that this is the sole purpose of the system. I must say that I find this view difficult to accept, despite the gaps in our intelligence.

My reasoning is this: First, the Soviets know very well that our offensive forces are increasingly dependent upon missiles.

Second, I am sure they know that the preferred tactic today for bomber forces is penetration at a low level, not high level. If the TALLINN system were designed to defend against a low level bomber

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penetration, it would make military sense to me. The opposite does not.

The TALLINN system is deployed across an area through which our missiles must fly. This is the "tube" or part of the tube that goes from North America to the Soviet Union. Be that as it may, however, the intelligence community also believes that regardless of what the TALLINN system is designed to do, the Soviets will probably extend and improve their ABM defenses over the coming years. This is the defensive aspect.

The offensive aspect is this. As pointed out in the Secretary's statement, the Soviets have accelerated the deployment of hardened ICBMs. By 1971 they may very well have 78 SS-7 and -8s, 125 to 150 SS-9s -- this is the large missile -- and 447 to as many as 872 SS-11s, a missile which, by ICBM standards, is small. It's roughly comparable to our MINUTEMAN, with about a megaton warhead.

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The characteristics of the warhead of the SS-11 are such that it is relatively inaccurate. It has been designated, therefore, as a "city buster." In other words, it is a weapon designed to attack our cities, destroy our population and our industry. It is not primarily designed to attack our missiles.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff don't know whether the Soviet over-all objective is strategic nuclear parity, or superiority. In either case, we believe that their probable aims are one or more of the following.

First, to reduce the United States' assured destruction capability-- that is, our ability to destroy their industry and their people.

Second, to complicate the targeting problem which we have in directing our strategic forces against the Soviet Union.

Third, to reduce US confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses, thereby reducing the possibility that the United States would undertake a pre-emptory first strike against the Soviet Union, even under extreme provocation.

Fourth, to achieve an exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war.

As pointed out in Mr. Vance's statement, his recommendation against deploying NIKE-X at this time is based fundamentally on the following, and I am quoting:

"The Soviet Union would be forced to react to U. S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force with the result that, first, the risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States

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would not be further decreased, and second, the damage to the United States from a nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that this judgment assumes that Soviet reaction to NIKE-X deployment will be equal, opposite, feasible and possible. We don't think that it gives sufficient weight to important interactions associated with deploying NIKE-X. Importantly, consideration of the interactions of not deploying the NIKE-X appears not to be weighed sufficiently.

We do not pretend to be able to predict with certainty just how the Soviets will react. We do know from experience the high price they must pay to overcome a deployed U.S. ABM system. Some of the costs to them are the following:

First, the economic and the technological expenditures necessary to counter the NIKE-X.

Second, the diversion of resources from other high priority programs.

Third, the virtual attrition of their nuclear payloads. In other words, if they install MIRVs and get more reentry vehicles -- if they install penetration aids -- as a result they will get fewer kilotons.

We feel that they would also be faced with the grave uncertainties associated with targeting against an ABM defended nation. We believe



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that the Soviet offensive and defensive buildup does increase the risk of nuclear war. Deterrence is a combination of forces in being, and state of mind.

Should the Soviets come to believe that their ballistic missile defense, coupled with a nuclear attack on the United States, would limit damage to the Soviet Union to a level acceptable to them, whatever that level is, our forces would no longer deter. The first principle of our security policy would be gone.

I should say here that while I certainly agree -- and so do the other Joint Chiefs -- that the basis of deterrence is the ability to destroy an attacker as a viable nation, as a part of this, there is also the ability of the nation to survive as a nation -- in other words, the converse of the first point.

Secondly, lack of a deployed U. S. ABM increases the possibility of a nuclear war by accident and by nth country triggering.

Thirdly, failure to deploy a U. S. ABM creates a strategic imbalance both within our forces and between the U. S. and the Soviet forces. It could lead to Soviet and allied belief that we are interested only in the offensive, that is, a first strike, or that our technology is deficient, or that we will not pay to maintain strategic superiority.

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We also believe that damage to the United States from a nuclear strike can be reduced by an ABM system in a meaningful way. Now, of course, nobody can say at what point of nuclear destruction a nation is no longer a viable society. We do know, or at least we have estimates, that the Soviets lost something like 25 million people in World War II. These losses are not exactly comparable, of course, to what would happen in a nuclear war, because they lost 25 million people over a period of some four or five years. We are talking here of the loss of 25 or more million people in a matter of hours, and the psychological shock and other effects would be considerably different.

Nevertheless, one nation will probably survive best in a nuclear exchange. The 30, 40, or 50 million American lives that could be saved by NIKE-X therefore, are meaningful, we believe, in every sense of the word.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs that we now initiate deployment of NIKE-X with an initial operating capability in 1972 is based fundamentally on the requirement to maintain the total strategic nuclear capability or balance clearly in favor of the United States.

Specifically, we believe that deployed NIKE-X would do one or more of the following. First, provide a damage limitation capability by attrition of a Soviet attack.

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Second, introduce uncertainties which would inhibit Soviet leaders from concluding that the United States could not survive a Soviet first strike or that the United States would not pre-empt under any circumstances.

Third, stabilize the nuclear balance.

Fourth, demonstrate to the Soviets and our allies that the United States is not first strike minded; in other words, that we don't put all of our eggs in the offensive basket.

Fifth, continue to deny to the Soviets an exploitable capability. By this I mean to continue the Cuba power environment in the world.

In regard to this last point, to explain it a bit, I should point out that by this we mean that, at the time of Cuba, the strategic nuclear balance was such that the Soviets did not have an exploitable capability, because of our vastly superior nuclear strength. To bring this forward into the present context, it's also the view of the Joint Chiefs that regardless of anyone's feelings about the situation in Vietnam, we think it quite clear that we would have had even more hesitation in deploying our forces there, had the strategic nuclear balance not been in our favor.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~Counselor and Chairman~~  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

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Attachment



May 29, 1967

TO: Planning Group Members

SUBJECT: Planning Group Meeting, Thursday,  
June 1, 1967

Attached is a copy of the paper "ABM's, Alliances  
and Arms Control" which we will discuss at our planning  
group meeting Thursday, June 1, 1967.

<sup>42</sup>  
Henry Owen

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Attachment

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ABM'S, ALLIANCES, AND ARMS CONTROL

DRAFT

May 25, 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-285  
By fw, NARA, Date 2-3-93

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May 25, 1967

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ABM'S, ALLIANCES, AND ARMS CONTROL

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in these matters. It is entirely possible -- even likely -- that our allies would not arrive at a common view. It is also possible that no common U.S.-European view would emerge. However, these contingencies would be far less hazardous to our interests than those entailed in making the decision first and trying to explain it later.

## II. - ABM'S AND ASIA'S STRATEGIC REASSESSMENT

### A. Asian Reaction to ABM Defense of U.S. Cities

1. While challenging the desirability and utility of competitive U.S.-Soviet deployment, U.S. statements on the ABM issue have emphasized the potential effectiveness of ABM's as a defense against Communist China's emerging nuclear force. The debate about whether we need defenses for this purpose is now building up. The ABM has, therefore, begun to figure -- and will figure increasingly -- in the strategic reassessment which has confronted Asian-Pacific countries from Japan to India since Communist China's first nuclear test.

2. Since the initiation of Communist China's nuclear test program, we have reaffirmed our commitments

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to our allies in the region and have promised all non-nuclear countries, including India, support against ChiCom threats of "nuclear blackmail." One effect of deploying ABM's to defend U.S. cities against ChiCom nuclear attack could be to bolster confidence in these commitments and assurances by helping stunt the growth in Asia of the nagging dilemma posed by Gallois in Europe: "Why should the U.S. hazard nuclear attack on its own cities in our behalf?" However, this approach to bolstering confidence could also be accompanied by some forces working in the opposite direction.

a. Gallois' ghost could prove difficult to exorcise. While we were arguing that the ChiCom missile force was so unsophisticated and limited that ABM's offered us an effective defense, Communist China might -- not unreasonably -- suggest that their missiles were so effective that we had felt compelled to introduce ABM's. They could claim (and would presumably seek) some means of avoiding or penetrating our ABM defenses. And so on. We don't have to concede victory to

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Communist China in such a battle of claims and counterclaims, but the fog of battle could well cloud the issue of the credibility of our commitments.

b. A different concern could also cloud this issue. Some might fear that the U.S. -- safe within its defenses -- would be freer to opt out of future crises. Some Asians might feel more secure if the U.S. were also directly threatened by Communist China and therefore less inclined to "sit this one out."\*

3. The credibility of U.S. commitments would not, in any event, be the only issue, and, indeed, it might not prove to be the principal issue.

a. It might not be entirely evident to all our Asian allies and friends that their own problems would be solved once U.S. cities had been surrounded by ABM's. They might derive

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\* This splendidly oriental line of reasoning has already been pre-figured in the comments of one Japanese planner. This would not have to become a predominant view to be dangerous to our interests. It might simply add to the questions which some Japanese might conclude would best be answered by Japan's "going nuclear."

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only limited comfort from any greater confidence that we certainly would retaliate if Communist China launched nuclear weapons against Tokyo, Taipei, Manila, New Delhi. We would presumably argue that the Chinese would also see greater certainty of our retaliating and, therefore, would more strongly be deterred from launching nuclear strikes in the first place. Nonetheless, Communist China's neighbors might become increasingly concerned about the same question we had obviously asked ourselves in deciding to deploy ABM's: What happens if deterrence fails?

b. Any such concern would be aggravated by the belief that defense was feasible -- but not available.

4. A further set of problems would relate to the reactions of those countries in the region which already have (or have a real prospect of acquiring) the capabilities needed to "go nuclear" -- Japan, India, and, over the longer term, Australia (where a recent report indicates

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indicates the nuclear issue is beginning to pick up steam). A U.S. ABM deployment decision would probably not automatically trigger pro-nuclear decisions by any of these countries. However, especially if such a decision followed the achievement of a non-proliferation treaty, such countries would unquestionably feel the limitations of their "have not" status more sharply. The ABM could figure in their subsequent actions in any of several ways.

a. In countries where domestic opinion was divided on the nuclear issue -- Japan in particular -- the feasibility of defense could be employed to win popular acceptance of the idea of nuclear weapons. Such an approach might be an end in itself (if ABM's could be obtained from us), or at least delay consideration of an offensive deterrent. However, it might also prove to be a stepping stone toward an offensive deterrent.

b. Should any of these countries desire to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty, they might believe that emphasis on their desire  
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for ABM defenses would be less abrasive internationally than emphasis on acquiring an offensive deterrent. They might also feel that we would be in a poor position to say they were wrong in wanting to do what we had just done.

c. The vertifical proliferation inherent in ABM deployment by the existing nuclear powers (whether this was done in the context of a U.S.-Soviet agreement or competitively) might be added to any stockpile of grievances which the "have not's" might deploy when the time came for a review of the non-proliferation treaty. Offensive hedging by the superpowers would also be added to this stockpile.

d. A further possibility is that the major "have not's" might seek to use the bargaining power implicit in being able to take the foregoing steps in order to convince us that we should make ABM's available.

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B. U.S. Offer of ABM's to Asian Countries

1. The foregoing suggests that in the Asian-Pacific region as well as Europe the ABM issue could prove to be a catalyst for centrifugal forces. A principal difference between the two situations is that whereas putting ABM's in Europe is not likely to be an effective counter to the Soviet nuclear threat, it is estimated that there is a good prospect for effective defense against the future ChiCom missile threat.

2. Accordingly, we ought to be prepared to offer ABM's to Asian countries if a U.S. ABM city-defense program should be based wholly or partly on the need for and effectiveness of the anti-ChiCom defense. There are two ways such an offer might be advanced.

a. The offer might be made to specific allies.

b. We might put forward a regional deployment concept to afford some degree of defense for all our major allies in the region and for India as well.

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3. The first of these two approaches might accommodate our needs in the key country of the region: Japan. But the effects would probably be divisive.

a. Against the background of wartime enmity, smouldering resentment against Japan's favored position could come to the fore and limit Japan's potentially useful regional role.

b. The Philippines and others could well ask (and would be foolish not to) why they should permit U.S. bases to make targets of their islands if we were not prepared to provide ABM's.

c. Having actively fought the common threat in Viet Nam, the Australians might feel entitled to priority.

d. As Communist China's oldest enemy and one of its potential targets, Taiwan could also claim priority.

e. From the standpoint of relations with Allies in the region, it would make no sense to offer ABM's to a non-ally, India, until the needs  
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of our allies had been met. Yet an Indian pro-nuclear decision could bring us full circle by unhinging the nuclear issue in Japan.\*

4. Political and psychological factors thus argue in favor of a broad deployment. Technical studies have not been made of the potential effectiveness of ABM's for all the major countries of the region, and no attempt will be made here to specify what particular countries might usefully be included. However, some general comments on this concept are in order:

a. A basic question concerns the feasibility of a sea-based approach to ABM deployment. Studies suggest that such an approach

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\*Given the facts that we are now pressing India to cut spending on conventional armaments and that we will expect India to adhere to an NPT, it would, of course, be sensible from the standpoint of U.S.-Indian relations to explore the possibility of ABM defense at an early stage unless we ourselves should rule out ABM city-defenses. The desirability of such discussions on a hypothetical basis would not be obviated by the type of security assurances now being considered. The following statement made by Secretary McNamara in his press conference of May 18, 1967, may, indeed, stimulate Indian interest: "Whether or not India would or would not wish to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system to protect itself against a potential attack from Red China, assuming we did, I can't say. My guess is they would."

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approach might employ an interceptor missile (possibly an adaptation of POLARIS or POSEIDON) which would have a substantially longer-range than that of the land-based ABM's now being developed.\*

b. If this long-range intercept concept should prove feasible, then a single ABM ship might, in some locations, afford a degree of protection to more than one country, and perhaps half a dozen or so ABM ships -- deployed from Japan to the Sub-Continent -- might add up to a regional defense system for neutralizing the ChiCom missile threat (but not, of course, the threat from other possible means of delivery, a limitation which would also apply to land-based ABM's).

c.

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\*The sea-based concept is viewed here as more promising in the Asian-Pacific region than in Europe. This tentative conclusion rests partly on the very large numbers of ABM's needed for defense against the Soviet missile force, and partly on the assumption that ABM ships off Europe would be relatively vulnerable to Soviet pre-emptive air or naval attack.

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c. The ships would be manned by U.S. personnel, but the country or countries defended by particular ships might maintain liaison officers aboard. The political problems involved in placing nuclear weapons on land in Asian countries would be avoided, and the problem of maintaining custody of the weapons would be greatly simplified. It is understood that land-based radars might provide useful support of a sea-based ABM system, and if this proved to be so in some locations, participation by indigenous personnel would be useful.

d. As a practical political matter, the deployment might be viewed as falling in two sectors. The first of these would cover East and Southeast Asia, including Australia and New Zealand. The countries of this sector might be encouraged to meet with a view to working out a common approach to such problems as the circumstances under which ABM's might actually be employed.

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employed. Such a meeting, if it could be brought off, might offer a start toward an eventually broad approach to regional security problems.

e. The second of the two defense sectors would be the Sub-Continent. Depending on the circumstances at the time, consideration might be given to an effort to bring the Indians and Paks together on the question of strategic defense of the Sub-Continent. The chance of doing so is negligible at present, but although the Paks do not now consider themselves threatened by Communist China's emerging nuclear capability, the time may conceivably come when they will recognize that they might well incur damage as a by-product of the use of strategic nuclear missiles by Communist China against India. Regardless of Pak attitudes, we might in any event, wish to adopt the posture of defending the Sub-Continent rather than India alone.

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f. The political advantages of sea-based deployment are clear, and the case is strong for pursuing that approach. However, it is assumed here that land-based ABM deployment could do the job even though greater political difficulties would be involved -- and probably greater expense as well.

g. The total cost of the sea-based approach would depend heavily on such variables as the feasibility of the long-range intercept concept, how many ships were considered necessary, how many ABM's each carried, whether supplementary land-based radars were needed in some cases, and the elaborateness of communications. One working estimate is around \$200 million per ship. This suggests that the six or seven ship concept considered here would run around \$1-1.5 billion. Estimates of the cost of various levels of land-based ABM deployments for Japan alone range from \$1.5 billion for area defense only to \$5 billion for area defense plus terminal defense of a number

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of cities. This suggests that if land-based installations had to be deployed in a number of countries, the total cost would be exceedingly high.\*

5. The details of a U.S. offer based on this general approach would need thorough study. However, some tentative points are as follows:

a. It is assumed here that in the case of the sea-based approach, we would not wish to sell the ships themselves. One alternative would be, in effect, to sell "shares" in the overall defensive systems (ships, radars, missiles but not warheads) protecting a given country. Thus, the U.S. and Japan would jointly own those ships assigned to Japan's defense. The U.S., Taiwan, and the Philippines would share ownership of  
another

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\*At this stage, it is well to question all cost estimates for both sea-based and land-based systems. However, if the estimates shown here are at least in the ballpark and if the sea-based system would do an adequate job, the sea-based approach would obviously have a substantial cost advantage in terms of the initial investment required. Relative operating costs would also, of course, have to be examined.

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another one or two ships. And so on. In all cases, the U.S. would hold a "voting majority." In addition, some annual payment toward operating costs should probably be required. In the event land-based ABM's were used, all major components except warheads might be sold, and operating costs would be a less significant factor since indigenous personnel might be employed, the main exception being the personnel needed for warhead custody. In both the sea-based and land-based cases, we would presumably need to retain the right to recover all "shares" or components.

b. The regional concept would be defeated if we were to insist that every country pay its full share of the cost. Accordingly, an "ability to pay" principle should be employed. Japan and Australia might reasonably be asked to bear their full share. In the case of such countries as the Philippines, some payment would be requested in order to avoid the rush to the store that would  
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take place if ABM's were being given away as door-prizes; on the other hand, the payment in such cases should be realistic in the sense of not being prohibitive.

c. It seems likely that only Japan could produce any of the components. This would have to be reviewed in detail.

d. As in the European case (Part I above), the President would retain ultimate control but would necessarily have to "delegate" authority to computers. Participating countries would have a say concerning the circumstances under which the computers would conclude the ABM's had to be launched. Although the significance of a veto is questionable, consideration could be given to offering a veto to each participating country. In the sea-based case, the exercise of such a veto might as a practical matter have to be vested in representatives aboard the ships. The U.S. would also retain a veto.

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e. Although it may or may not prove correct, it is widely assumed that Communist China will be able to acquire useful MR or IRBM's before an ICBM (or SLBM) capability materializes. Accordingly, it would be especially important not to take the position that U.S. defense would have to be completed before ABM's could be made available to countries around Communist China's periphery.

6. In the absence of firmer estimates of the price and technical effectiveness of ABM's in various locations in the Asian-Pacific region, it is difficult to forecast reaction to a U.S. offer along the foregoing lines. On the whole, the chance (or risk) of widespread interest seems larger than in the comparable European case. What is clear is that we would need to make such an offer -- and make it on a sufficiently broad and reasonable basis to preclude significant divisive effects. If this were not done, the cost of a U.S. ABM deployment would be high -- not only in terms of our subsequent relations with allies and friends in the region, but also in terms of regional political and nuclear stability.

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C. Safeguarding U.S. Political Interests

1. The foregoing approach would be essential only if the U.S. should decide to deploy ABM's wholly or partly for defense of its own cities against Communist China. Additional steps, however, are needed to safeguard our political interests.

2. As is often the case, the most useful first step is one that could be taken here at home. The ABM debate will be very costly if it succeeds in magnifying the ChiCom nuclear threat in the eyes of Communist China's neighbors, and in convincing such countries that our concern about being unable to deter a nuclear attack by Communist China is so great that we need not be counted on unless we can be sure of escaping all conceivable nuclear injury to ourselves. To avoid such effects, the ABM should not be described as the sine qua non of our survival but as a "bonus."

3. If the most significant signals we transmit are those which flow from what we say about ABM's at home, consultation with other countries is next in importance. In the Asian-Pacific region as in Europe, consultation  
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that is too little and too late is as detrimental to our interests as none at all. Unlike the European case, there is no all-inclusive forum to which we can turn in Asia. We can, however, pursue the matter in the several forums that exist (ANZUS, SEATO) and in bilateral talks with countries which are not members of such groups -- most importantly Japan. We should also be prepared to talk with major non-aligned countries, in particular India (although not predictable at present, circumstances might come about which would suggest the usefulness of some talks with the Indonesians.)

4. Whatever the most appropriate means of communication, there are several crucial points which we should try to get across to allies and friends (and possibly to the Communist Chinese themselves):

a. That, at least up to this time, Communist China's military calculations have been cautious and rational, and that we have no reason to suppose they will be less rational in assessing the cost of employing nuclear weapons.

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b. That our substantial non-nuclear capabilities (and the availability of tactical nuclear weapons if needed) should obviate any concern about rapid or inevitable escalation of future Asian conflicts to strategic nuclear levels.

c. That while Communist China will have no conceivable means of mounting a disarming strike against us, the reverse is not true (and that if we should be confronted with any need to carry out such a strike, there would be no reason for the Soviet Union to be confused about our purposes).\*

d. That in all likelihood neither Communist China -- nor other countries which might be tempted to "go nuclear" -- will derive security or satisfaction from nuclear capabilities suitable only for hitting someone else's cities at the cost of losing their own.

e. That ABM's have to be viewed in this overall perspective.

III.

\*The question of a disarming strike against ChiCom nuclear capabilities could arise, for example, in a situation where U.S. cities were defended by ABM's but those of Communist China's Free World neighbors were undefended.

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4

### Memorandum of Conversation

DATE July 16, 1965

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in the Ryukyu Islands

**PARTICIPANTS:** Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army  
 David McGifford, Under Secretary of the Army  
 John M. Steadman, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs  
 Lt. Col. William J. Spahr, Office of the Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs

**COPIES TO:** Edwin O. Reischauer, American Ambassador to Japan  
 Robert A. Fearey, Director for East Asian Affairs  
 Richard W. Petree, Officer-in-Charge, Japanese Affairs

COPIES TO: FE - Department of the Army -  
 EA -  
 Amembassy TOKYO -

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#### Pre-Treaty Claims

Secretary Resor said committee hearings in the House of Representatives on the Department of the Army's Okinawan pre-Treaty claims bill were scheduled to be held July 28. General Watson has expressed his strong hope that legislative action authorizing payment of these claims can be taken before the opening of the Okinawan legislative election campaign this fall. The Department of the Army also has its appropriation bill coming up for consideration in the Senate, a fact that must be taken into consideration in approaching the Congress for legislation on the pre-Treaty claims. In response to a question, Secretary Resor and Mr. McGifford said they hoped to get some feel for Congressional attitudes toward the pre-Treaty claims bill after July 20, when they expected to meet with Senator Sparkman. The key staff members of the pertinent Congressional committees have been sympathetic with the proposed legislation, but as yet there is no clear indication of the attitudes of the Congressmen and Senators.

#### Prime Minister Sato's Visit to Okinawa

Ambassador Reischauer said he felt that it was essential to amend the Price Act to raise the limit on U.S. aid to the Ryukyus. Secretary Resor agreed that this should be done. He said the Department of the Army was drafting a memorandum requesting authorization from the Department of Defense and Bureau of the Budget to go ahead with a legislative request for this purpose. He recalled that the House originally passed a \$25 million a year

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ceiling on U.S. aid, but the Senate cut it back to the \$12 million that is currently in effect. The Department of the Army does not have to ask Congress for authorization to spend this amount on aid each year, but it does have to fight for appropriations to fund it. Secretary Resor said Congressman Passman is the real problem in obtaining funds. He recalled that when General Watson testified before Congress this spring, Mr. Passman asked the General if the Army would be coming in for a higher level of funds for Okinawa. General Watson limited his reply to saying that he could not predict what might be required, but it was possible.

Secretary Resor said General Watson would like to have an open-ended authorization for aid, with no specified limit set in the law. The Secretary said he and his staff felt, however, that General Watson's hope was unrealistic and that they should endeavor to obtain authorization for a \$25 million ceiling. He believed \$25 million would be sufficient in the short run.

Ambassador Reischauer agreed that approximately \$25 million in U.S. aid funds for Okinawa should be enough in the short run. He said we should aim at providing a total of about \$50 million in external assistance each year, combining the Japanese contribution with our own. The \$50 million figure was derived by comparing the Ryukyus with prefectures like Saga in the main islands of Japan, which have about the same population and economic level as the Ryukyus. Saga receives funds of various kinds from the central government, over and above local revenues, that amount to about \$50 million a year. We should try to assist the Ryukyus at approximately the same level, concentrating primarily on the education and social security systems. He said it was not realistic for us to attempt to effect a substantial raise in the standard of living of the Ryukyans, but we could contribute funds at the same level that the Japanese Government does for its prefectures. The Ambassador said he felt, nonetheless, that General Watson's proposal to make a public statement defining some broad goals for improvement of the living standards of the Ryukyans was fine.

Secretary Resor said he had had doubts about the wisdom of setting up such high goals since they probably could not be achieved. Ambassador Reischauer agreed that achievement of such goals would be unlikely, but he felt that a statement containing such grand objectives would be politically useful. Secretary Resor felt that it would be better to set our sights on achievable goals. Ambassador Reischauer agreed that it might be better to pitch our effort toward concrete, measurable goals, such as improvement of public education and establishment of social security benefits at the same levels as Japan's. He felt, however, that there would be no harm in making a public statement about grand objectives for political purposes. Secretary Resor said the kind of living standard goals suggested for public statement

a public statement about grand objectives for political purposes

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by General Watson were unattainable in the short run, so he felt that it was not wise to play them up in a public statement.

Ambassador Reischauer said he looked on the effort to get the Price Act amended, improve the Ryukyuan public education system, and other measures as only stop-gap measures. He felt strongly that we had only relatively little time remaining to us in the Ryukyus. The fundamental nationalistic reaction of the Japanese and Ryukyuan has been exacerbated by developments in Viet-Nam. Two years ago he was relaxed about the Okinawan problem, and had no worry about possible termination dates for our tenure in the islands. Since the last few months' events in Viet-Nam, however, he has revised his thinking completely. The mood in Japan and the Ryukyus has changed, and we have only a short period left in the Ryukyus. For this reason he did not feel concerned about the possible repercussions of making public statements containing grand promises. He said he considers action on the Price Act aid ceiling essential regardless of the period of time left to us in the Ryukyus. It is particularly important to us this fall because of the Ryukyuan elections scheduled for November. If we lose those elections, the play-back in the Japanese political scene will make it harder for the Japanese Government to hold its present position of cooperative acquiescence in our continued presence in the Ryukyus.

Secretary Resor said he was somewhat concerned about the requests for legislative action on the Price Act and the pre-Treaty claims piling up together in Congress. He said the Department of the Army intended to press for action on the pre-Treaty claims first and then turn to the Price Act. Ambassador Reischauer said we needed to make up our minds on whether to seek amendment of the Price Act in time to inform Prime Minister Sato of our intention prior to his visit to Okinawa in August. This would permit him to make a public announcement of the Japanese Government's consideration of large-scale aid to the Ryukyus.

Secretary Resor said the Department of the Army had reached a decision to go ahead with an effort to get the Price Act amended. Mr. McGifford said they had had a difficult time in getting Congress to approve the \$12 million aid limit. He recalled that Senator Russell had been opposed. It probably would be wise to discuss the further amendment of the Price Act with Congressional leaders before launching a formal legislative proposal. He said the tactics in Congress would require careful study.

Ambassador Reischauer said the Senate side in Congress constituted the most serious problem. General Watson wants a firm decision on this

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matter by early August so he can clear his handling of the proposed Japanese statement on large-scale aid at the time of Prime Minister Sato's visit to Okinawa. General Watson also wishes to discuss this matter in advance with Chief Executive Matsuoka. Secretary Resor was assured by Mr. McGifford and Colonel Spahr that a paper requesting DOD authorization to go ahead with the Price Act amendment was being prepared.

Ambassador Reischauer asked if the Japanese proposal that Sato make an announcement about long-term, low interest financial assistance to the Ryukyus would be acceptable to the Department of the Army. Secretary Resor said that would not pose any problems from Army's point of view.

Ambassador Reischauer went on to say that the Japanese request that restrictions on the flying of the Japanese flag in the Ryukyus be lifted was just as important to them as the large-scale economic aid proposal, according to a Foreign Office spokesman. Secretary Resor said our experience with a similar flag problem in Panama was extremely difficult. About five years ago we decided to permit the U.S. and Panamanian flags to be flown jointly in the Canal Zone. He said they felt now that this decision had only accelerated the emergence of nationalistic feelings in Panama. The U.S. and Japanese flags are therefore not flown jointly in the Ryukyus except at the USCAR headquarters, which also happens to house the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI). He said the time remaining to us in the Ryukyus would make a difference in judgment on this question: if Ambassador Reischauer's assessment that we have only a short tenure left is correct, then the flag issue in connection with Sato's visit is not a significant question from our point of view; if we can hope for a longer tenure in the islands, however, the flag issue might be very significant.

Ambassador Reischauer said there was no doubt in his mind that the situation had changed in recent months, so we now have only a fairly short period of assured tenure in the islands. We should start moving toward an arrangement with the Japanese Government on a different basis. We are on the edge of a distinct change in the whole U.S.-Japan relationship. The year 1970 looms as a major "waterfall". A few months ago he felt that although 1970 was only 5 years away, the relationship with Japan seemed to be going well and the potential crisis in the relationship seemed likely to smooth itself out before we even reached 1970. Now, however, things are not going well for us in Japan, and this past spring we even moved backward in our relationship. Since May we seem to have halted the backward motion and are now holding our own, and if the Viet-Nam problem achieves some kind of solution we could recoup our losses and go on as before without changing our policies. The chances of a solution in Viet-Nam in the near future appear slim, however, and time is running out on us.

before without changing our policies. SECRET The chances of a solution in Viet-

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There has been a rise in nationalism in both Japan and the Ryukyus, accelerated by reactions to Viet-Nam. For these reasons, Ambassador Reischauer believed that the Okinawan problem would come to the explosion point before 1970.

Ambassador Reischauer said our safest strategy, in view of these trends, is not to continue to drift along in our relationship with Japan. We must start to do some paddling. He is convinced we can successfully influence these developments. The conservatives in Japan have always dodged such issues as defense, but more of them are now coming to believe that they will have to take a positive stand, and that they will be able to face the Japanese public on the need for defense. The thorniest problem the conservatives face is Okinawa, but if we can help the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) solve the Okinawan problem it will be a great asset for us, as well as for them. Ambassador Reischauer said he wanted to talk privately with key conservative leaders about the solution proposed by former Finance Minister Tanaka (now Secretary General of the LDP), who created quite a furor in Japan at the time of the visit to Japan of former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy by stating that the best solution to the Okinawan problem would be for the Japanese people to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. If Japan would accept nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, including Okinawa, and if it would provide us with assurances guaranteeing our military commanders effective control of the islands in time of military crisis, then we would be able to keep our bases in the islands, even though administrative control or "full sovereignty" reverted to Japan. Ambassador Reischauer said we must achieve this new arrangement before the blow-up comes in Okinawa.

Secretary Resor asked if Ambassador Reischauer envisaged a new treaty with Japan in effect placing Okinawa outside the limitations of the Japanese Constitution. Ambassador Reischauer said something like that would be necessary, although there was no explicit prohibition against nuclear weapons in the Constitution. We have a relatively short time to work these arrangements out, but unless we do we will again run into a Panama situation. If the U.S. were forced by military developments to bomb populated centers in North Viet-Nam, bringing the Chinese Communists into direct participation in the war, we might need to bolster our defenses along the DMZ in Korea with some actions from our bases in Japan. Under the present circumstances, the Japanese Government could not give us permission to use our bases in Japan for these purposes.

Mr. Steadman asked how soon a blow-up in the Ryukyus might come, whether it might be in 1970. Ambassador Reischauer said even 1970 was more worrisome to him than before. Okinawa, however, cannot be held on present terms

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for more than two years.

Secretary Resor, referring to Ambassador Reischauer's suggestion that we take the initiative to work out new arrangements involving Japanese administrative control of the islands, said he did not clearly understand what we would get from the Japanese conservatives in exchange for our acquiescence in such a solution. Ambassador Reischauer said that if the LDP achieved agreement with the U.S. on the reversion of the islands to full Japanese sovereignty, it would be a major political coup strengthening the party's position in the face of opposition pressure and in the eyes of the Japanese public. With this problem solved and out of the way, the LDP would be able to talk directly on defense questions and Southeast Asian development. The important benefit to the U.S. would be that we would have a much more stable base for our relationship with Japan, and for a longer period of time. It would eliminate the most serious threat to U.S.-Japan relations, and would enlist Japan as an ally more deeply committed to our vitally important goals in Southeast Asia. At present we have nothing but strike forces based in Japan, other than various support elements. Perhaps we should have defensive forces stationed there, perhaps at Japanese expense. We should be moving much more into joint strategic consultations with the Japanese. In short, the Okinawan solution proposed by Ambassador Reischauer would convert Japan "from a cool but pleasant partner to a true ally".

Mr. McGifford asked the period of agreement Ambassador Reischauer was thinking of. Ambassador Reischauer said the agreement would be without termination date. He said developments in the wake of our military actions in Viet-Nam had changed his time-sense. He reiterated his belief that we should go to the Japanese in an effort to work a package arrangement which would include Okinawa.

Mr. Steadman said there were several theoretically possible alternatives and asked the Ambassador whether he felt some kind of shared administration arrangement might work with the Japanese in Okinawa. Ambassador Reischauer said he thought it would be better to make a clean break, rather than trying to work out the many complicated problems that would arise in a shared administration situation.

Mr. Fearey wondered whether the LDP would consent to an agreement that gave them no rights to "consult" with the U.S. on the utilization of the military bases in Okinawa. He found it hard to visualize the LDP not requiring the kind of consultative rights they have in relation to U.S. bases in Japan. Ambassador Reischauer said the Japanese would achieve reversion, which would overshadow any question about consultative rights. Mr. Fearey agreed that reversion would be a big political plus for the LDP but lack of any Japanese say over our use of the Ryukyus bases would considerably reduce this. He doubted whether we

consultative rights. Mr. Fearey agreed that reversion would be a big political plus for the LDP but lack of any Japanese say over our use of



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could give Japan any real say in the use of our bases in Okinawa. Ambassador Reischauer said we would be giving them all of the politically important symbols, which would be enough.

Mr. Steadman wondered if the Ambassador's suggestion would buy two or three years. If the situation has deteriorated as far as Ambassador Reischauer indicated, we should be considering contingency plans and plans for coping with riots and unrest in the Ryukyus. Ambassador Reischauer said that if we lose the elections in November there will be a certain amount of trouble. The important thing, however, is not disturbances in Okinawa but the play-back in Japan, where the repercussions could affect Japanese Government willingness to cooperate with us on Okinawa. Mr. Fearey said the effects might show up in Japanese Government inability to cooperate with us in matters completely unrelated to the Ryukyus, e.g., SEA economic development.

Ambassador Reischauer said that the Joint Economic Committee meeting July 12-14 made him feel that we could talk about such things discreetly with Japanese leaders. The Japanese moved forward during the recent talks. Minister of International Trade and Industry Miki and Finance Minister Fukuda in particular, two key leaders in the present government, seemed responsive on the Southeast Asian development proposals. They seemed to feel that they could make political profit from a positive economic role in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Steadman asked the Ambassador when he thought we could approach the Japanese on these sensitive matters. Ambassador Reischauer said he thought he could sound them out, tentatively at first, on his return to Japan. He said he wanted to sound out Prime Minister Sato first. He had already dropped a casual suggestion with Sato that he consider dropping by Washington for talks with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk after he attended the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. Sato seemed to react favorably to that idea.

Mr. Steadman asked Ambassador Reischauer if he had met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff during his current visit to Washington. He recalled that when the Ambassador met with the Joint Chiefs in January 1965 he had spoken of a different time span for our tenure in the Ryukyus. Ambassador Reischauer said his thinking had changed since then. His calculation of time then depended primarily upon an assessment of the rising nationalism in Japan and the Ryukyus. Since then, however, the Viet-Nam situation has generated other strong reactions that must be taken into account.

Secretary Resor asked whether Ambassador Reischauer had discussed his ideas with Secretary McNamara. The Ambassador said he had, and at Secretary McNamara's suggestion had written a memorandum on the subject to him and to Secretary Rusk.

ideas with Secretary McNamara. The Ambassador said he had, and at Secretary

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Mr. Steadman said the business of day-to-day government in the Ryukyus would still have to go on with careful handling. Ambassador Reischauer said that General Watson had been doing an extraordinary job in the Ryukyus. He did not feel that in the daily government of the islands General Watson had left anything undone that should be done. General Watson's personality and wisdom have made a great contribution there. He said the large scale increase of aid to the Ryukyus is essential, with particular focus on concrete achievements in the educational and social security systems. As compared with these goals, the flag issue is not so important.

Mr. Steadman said that if Ambassador Reischauer's thesis were accepted, the flag issue was only a tactical problem — when and how to handle it for the greatest benefit in our immediate position in the islands. Mr. Fearey said that although with the passage of time we tend to forget it, it is somewhat anomalous for one ally and partner to administer nearly a million people of the other, essentially against their will. Ambassador Reischauer said he felt we had been lucky to hold our position this long. Secretary Resor said there was a great deal of missionary work to be done in Congress in connection with the expanded aid authorization, pre-Treaty claims, and other matters.

#### Secret Action Plan

Ambassador Reischauer raised the subject of the proposed plan for U.S. action to influence the elections in the Ryukyus. Mr. Steadman said he had been informed that the 303 Committee was scheduled to consider this plan at a meeting on Thursday, July 22.

Ambassador Reischauer asked Secretary Resor whether he had read the letter on this subject from former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green. Secretary Resor indicated that he had read it. The Ambassador said he thought the letter was a very good statement of the problem and represented his views. He said he felt strongly that we should not incur a double liability, a double danger of exposure of our action by channeling funds into the Okinawan election through two routes. It would be much safer to use only the Japanese route, permitting the Japanese LDP to handle the money in the most effective way. Okinawa is a small place, like a small town in the U.S. Okinawa is also like a small country prefecture in Japan, where political maneuvers — particularly involving money — are well known. It would be risky to try to take clandestine political action in Okinawa using direct U.S.-Ryukyuan channels. The Japanese conservatives are going to be involved with funds and other activities in the Ryukyuan elections anyway, and it would be a perfect cover to simply add to their resources rather than trying to carry it out directly in the Ryukyus.

channels. The Japanese conservatives are going to be involved with funds

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Mr. Steadman said he had been informed that the risks of the two routes for these funds were about equal. That being so, he had felt it would be just as well to use at least part of the funds directly in the Ryukyus. Ambassador Reischauer did not feel that the risks were equal. The Okinawan situation is weak. General Watson has an understandable desire to maintain close and effective control on the use of these funds, but the money ought to go through the Japanese conservatives. If the U.S. is caught with its hand in the cookie jar there will be a serious blow-up in Japan.

Mr. Fearey asked whether Ambassador Reischauer had discussed this matter with General Watson in these terms. The Ambassador said he had expressed his views to General Watson at the outset of planning, but he had not talked personally with him about it recently. Secretary Resor asked if money given into Japanese hands would be likely to reach its targets in the Ryukyus. Ambassador Reischauer said it would be perfectly safe, because the Japanese conservatives have a vital stake in an election victory just as we do. Mr. Steadman asked whether there was any doubt about the comparative risks in the two alternative routes. Ambassador Reischauer said he thought there was no doubt that the Japanese LDP provided the safer route, although there is no absolute guarantee of safety either way.

Mr. Steadman said he thought they should send Ambassador Reischauer's views to General Watson for his comments. He explained that their thinking had been based in part on a desire to carry out the action plan as much as possible without deepening Japanese political involvement in the islands. Ambassador Reischauer expressed understanding but said he was not concerned on this score in the overall situation presented.

Secretary Resor, in summing up the consensus of the meeting, said they would go ahead with work on the memorandum to DOD requesting authorization for an effort to obtain legislative action amending the Price Act. He noted the short deadline created by the Sato visit to Okinawa in August.

Concerning the flag issue, Mr. Fearey said he had discussed the matter with Mr. Yasukawa of the Foreign Office and had gotten the impression that Yasukawa understood why a change in current regulations governing the flying of the Japanese flag in the Ryukyus might be difficult for us to accept. Yasukawa did not seem inclined to press the issue. Mr. Fearey said he had some doubt of the wisdom of a change in flag regulations during Sato's visit, which could lead to the impression that as a result of Sato's talks in the Ryukyus, the U.S. had accorded Japan a role in Ryukyus administration. Certainly the press might so picture it. Another occasion might be better if we decide to move in this direction.

Certainly the press might so picture it. Another occasion might be better if

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Ambassador Reischauer said a concession on the flag issue was not absolutely essential to a successful Sato visit. Sato's visit itself will help to strengthen the Okinawan Democratic Party position in the fall elections. The Japanese can probably live without a concession on the flag issue. Ambassador Reischauer said that we started the train of developments leading to the present nationalistic focus on the flag issue when we issued Japanese textbooks in Okinawa some years ago. The books all start out with references to "our country" and remind Okinawans that they are Japanese.

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*U. Alexis Johnson*  
*with*  
*Jef Olivaricus McAllister*

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had to be able to present its policies as something that served its own people. My job was to convince it that liberalization really did serve Japan's long-term interests.

Our security relations presented a much more subtle, difficult, and engrossing problem. I spent the bulk of my time and effort attempting to recast them. The basic source of difficulty was that the United States had been ultimately responsible for Japan's defense since the Occupation, under the 1952 and 1960 Security Treaties. Japan maintained its own small "self-defense forces" (Article IX of the MacArthur-imposed Constitution "renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation" and prohibited the Japanese government from possessing armed forces in the conventional sense), but the United States supplied Japan's "nuclear umbrella" and a range of conventional deterrents to aggression, including large naval and air bases. These bases caused a certain amount of inconvenience. Japan's reliance on American protection necessarily denied it complete autonomy in world affairs, though it simultaneously permitted the country the great luxuries of minute defense spending and few international responsibilities. Senior LDP members wanted American protection to continue while reducing its irritations. But the Socialists, the main opposition party, wanted to complete the pacifist vision of Article IX and advocated "unarmed neutrality"—eviction of all American forces on the assumption that no one would then disturb the country's tranquility.

Reischauer had not devoted much attention to security issues. He had not been comfortable with them and, more important, the Japanese government had not wanted to discuss them, since public opinion was still easily aroused by the "militarist" implications of any attempt to bolster the country's security. But it had become time to address this very basic question of the kind of role a mature Japan should play in world affairs. It was a question on which I had a good deal of background and some firm opinions, but it was something that had to be raised very discreetly, to avoid engaging the government's hypersensitivity to charges of warmongering.

I intended to keep a lower profile than Ed had anyway, that was my personal style, and with Ed's success the need for a highly visible ambassador had passed. It was time to move on to more "standard" diplomacy between professional diplomats, in itself a symbol of the increasingly equal relationship I hoped to build. With a low profile and my reputation for being close to Secretary Rusk and President Johnson (often mentioned in the

Japanese press), I felt I could gain the confidence of the bureaucrats, top executives, and Diet members who really ran the country and try to advance their collective thinking on security questions. After laying this groundwork, the debate could be widened to the public at large.

I even tried to sell the press on the virtues of this approach at my first news conference on November 9. Explaining that I was a believer in "quiet diplomacy," I said that "to the degree that we diplomats can resolve questions without their becoming public issues we are successful, to the degree that we make headlines, you can say that we are not successful. When matters become the subject of public controversy, positions tend to become frozen and the settlement of the questions becomes more difficult." This policy, with its implication that I could not be counted on as the source of hot news stories, did not exactly make me a darling of the press, though I believe it held their respect. In any case, it did allow me to get things done.

Three security problems, separate but requiring a common approach from the United States, needed the most attention. First was America's continuing administrative control (dating from the Occupation) of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands. The Bonins are a tiny chain about 650 miles south of Tokyo, of which the best known is Iwo Jima, site of the ferocious World War II battle. Our Coast Guard maintained some small but important Long Range Navigation (LORAN) facilities there that helped our submarines in the Pacific and other ships to sail accurately. The Bonins were otherwise not important to our military posture in the Pacific. The Ryukyus were much more significant. Among them is the major island of Okinawa, with nearly a million inhabitants. The Ryukyus and Bonins were still recognized as Japanese territory, but the 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty gave the United States government "administrative rights" over them indefinitely. We had been in no hurry to return these rights to Tokyo because on Okinawa we had some of our largest naval and air bases in the Far East.

Retaining administrative control over Okinawa and the Bonins had been the price the Joint Chiefs of Staff extracted for going along with the Japanese Peace Treaty. Because we controlled Okinawa we could use our bases for storing nuclear weapons and mounting operations outside Japan (for example, air strikes over Korea or Vietnam). These were rights denied to our bases in Japan proper, under the 1960 Security Treaty, without "prior consultation" with the Japanese government. The Penta-

gon did not want to give up these very useful rights, the likely price of having Tokyo regain control.

But our presence on Okinawa was becoming anachronistic. American military governors were directing the affairs of a million non-Americans with varying degrees of sophistication, assisted since 1961 by a civilian civil administrator. The Japanese had never shown much concern for the welfare of Okinawa when Tokyo controlled it before the war, in fact, the Okinawans had been quite brutally discriminated against because the Ryukyus had been an independent kingdom entirely separate from Japan until the expansionist phase of the Meiji restoration, and its inhabitants spoke a dialect different from mainland Japanese. Nevertheless, since the 1950s Japanese politicians (some in the ruling LDP, but mostly the socialists and other opposition members) had suddenly rediscovered their close ties of affection and history with the Ryukyuan and made great anti-American hay of our continuing presence. The local population had been cooperative with the American military for the most part, even in the face of some fairly inept high commissioners. But recently there had been protest demonstrations, and anti-American sentiment was clearly rising. I saw this myself in a trip I took to Okinawa several months after I arrived in Japan, when members of the left-wing opposition were boycotting the Ryukyuan legislature to dramatize their differences with the more pro-American majority party.

The Okinawan police force was small and not terribly efficient, its only backup was American troops. If the opposition were ever able to foment a demonstration that got so out of hand that American soldiers had to fire on Okinawan civilians, the outrage would be enormous. We could not afford that. With two major airfields for F-4s and B-52s, hundreds of acres of Army storage and maintenance facilities, a full Marine Division with all its equipment, and extensive training grounds, Okinawa was a crucial ingredient in our Asian deterrent against Soviet, Chinese, and especially North Korean aggression. I was convinced it was time to return responsibility to Japan for the Ryukyus and the Bonins. They were a vestige of the war that might easily provoke an ugly incident that could unravel the patient work of two decades and force us out of our bases in Japan as well as on Okinawa.

To return administrative rights and responsibilities for the Ryukyus to Tokyo took five years of very demanding "quiet diplomacy," as much within the United States Government as with the Japanese. Even the negotiations about the Bonins, which were

comparatively straightforward, took two years. I will return to this story later, and I raise it here only because it ties into the second major security issue on my Tokyo agenda: the future of American bases on the Japanese home islands, and America's defense role in East Asia generally.

The 1952 Security Treaty, signed the same day the Peace Treaty came into force, pledged the United States to defend Japan in case of need and permitted the United States to retain bases in the country. The Korean War was then raging only 100 miles away across the Sea of Japan, and Japan's fledgling Self-Defense Forces were quite inadequate because of Article IX. Thus our military responsibilities in Japan were sizeable, and our military facilities were correspondingly large. In 1952 we had 2,824 bases and facilities, ranging from airfields and ammunition dumps to chapels and golf courses, covering some 1300 square kilometers. The Security Treaty gave us the right to use them as we saw fit without consulting the Japanese government beforehand, even if we wanted to mount operations against another country from them.

Many Japanese worried that this unlimited freedom for American forces might attract an attack—perhaps from Russia, seeking to neutralize the bases, or from North Korea or China bombing airfields in Japan from which we were mounting operations—and thus left the fundamental decision of whether Japan would be at war or peace to Washington. Another Occupation-era provision that rankled many Japanese (and worried American officials) permitted American troops to put down large-scale internal disturbances in Japan if requested by the Japanese government.

We had agreed in 1958 to a Japanese request to place our security arrangements on a more equal footing. Negotiations resulted in a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed on January 19, 1960, which governed defense relations during the whole time when I was Ambassador. Like our security treaties with other countries, it pledged us to come to Japan's defense if it were attacked. It also required us to "consult" with the Japanese government if we intended to mount combat operations outside Japan from our home island bases or introduce significantly different types of weapons (meaning nuclear) into them. The internal security provisions of the 1952 pact were scrapped.

In every important respect the 1960 treaty had enhanced Japan's control over its own affairs, but socialists and other opponents of the LDP and its conservative Prime Minister, Nobuo

master politician's easy, friendly manner, and I respected and enjoyed working with him. Because of the reporters and photographers who constantly surrounded the Prime Minister, however, meeting him without raising unwelcome press attention and speculation was virtually impossible. Therefore, I normally maintained contact with Sato through a senior Japanese Foreign Service Officer Teruo Kosu who acted as his private secretary. Kosu and I made considerable use of the telephone and when we needed to exchange written material, he could call on me at the Embassy or I could send a junior embassy officer to see him without attracting attention.

One way of circumventing Sato's press gauntlet was to escort the endless stream of official Washington visitors, both congressional and Executive, who wished to call on him. I have always found it strange that many American officials feel that foreign Prime Ministers, even in the case of great countries like Japan, are under some sort of obligation to receive them, even though they would be shocked if a foreign visitor of comparable rank insisted on meeting the President. However, Sato understood this situation and was always generous and gracious in receiving them. Some, of course, were useful and important for him to see. In any event, I frequently took advantage of these visits to have a quick private word with the Prime Minister, or he with me. Another pipeline to Sato was the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nobuhiko Ushiba, who had been close to Sato for many years and saw him regularly.

Sato, like many senior Japanese officials, was a graduate of Tokyo University law school. He began his career as a railroad official in 1924 and rose to Vice Minister of the Ministry of Transportation, the senior career official, during the Second World War. He was brought into politics by Japan's first post-war Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, who deftly but autocratically steered the country through Occupation and Peace Treaty negotiations into independence between 1946 and 1954. Briefly discredited because of a campaign contribution scandal in 1953, Sato resumed his upward climb in 1958, and when Hayato Ikeda resigned in 1964 because of health, Sato was elected President of the LDP and thus Prime Minister with virtually no opposition. He remained Prime Minister until 1972, longer than anyone in post-war Japanese history.

Sato was firmly convinced of the importance of bolstering Japan's ties with the United States. This exposed him to some domestic criticism. But his desire to liquidate the last remnants

of the war by obtaining reversion of the Bonins and Ryukyus did not have solely domestic roots. Certainly the LDP's appeal relative to the socialists and communists would increase among the voters if he managed to achieve reversion, but Sato basically shared my view that inequality between Japan and the United States was the biggest obstacle to our becoming closer allies. Blessed with an acute sense of what his electorate would accept at a given moment, he cultivated a conservative image while he gently but firmly steered Japan towards a fundamentally new policy of constructive participation in world affairs.

The appearance of caution Sato projected was dictated not only by his personal instinct and Japanese political custom, but also by the lesson of his older brother, Nobusuke Kishi. (According to a frequent Japanese practice, Sato changed his family name to that of his wife when he married.) Kishi was the Prime Minister who used his 'mechanical majority' to ratify the 1960 Security Treaty, causing popular outrage, riots, and the embarrassing forced cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit. Sato never forgot this miscalculation and was careful to build a consensus within the LDP's many factions and within the electorate before making any new departures.

As I settled down to work, Okunawa was the biggest single job I faced. What the United States would do with our bases and administrative rights there was the question I heard most often and most emotionally from every Japanese group, from the Cabinet down. Prime Minister Sato was due to visit Washington in November 1967, and two months before then, Foreign Minister Miki was scheduled to attend the annual meeting of American and Japanese Cabinet ministers. These two events, especially the November summit, imposed a welcome pressure on negotiations, both within the American and Japanese governments and between them, not that we felt we had to give Sato something tangible on Okinawa whatever the cost, but it gave us a specific target date to shoot for.

The first requirement was to establish a regular mechanism for discussing Okinawa and other security subjects with the Japanese government. All security questions between the United States and Japan were handled on their side by the Foreign Office. Even the nuts and bolts work of how we ran our bases and paid the Japanese working on them was handled by USFJ on our side but the Foreign Office on their side, bypassing the SDA entirely. So shortly after my arrival I spoke to Vice Foreign Minister Sh-



moda about creating a small, private group to begin frank, informal and substantive discussions on the whole range of security issues we both faced, including the Bomins, Okinawa, and American bases on the home islands. Shimoda was interested but understandably skittish about the storm of criticism that news of such a group could generate. He feared that the Opposition and newspapers would charge that the government was plotting military action with the United States without parliamentary consent, which would violate Article IX.

The 1960 Security Treaty had already established the high-level Security Consultative Committee, but its members necessarily spoke formally on behalf of their governments, with no real opportunity for badly needed exploratory exchanges. To help defuse potential criticism of this new body for discussing security, I proposed that we call it a subcommittee of the already-existing Consultative Committee. I continued to press the idea with Sato, Miki, and Shimoda, and in May 1967 we had our first meeting at the official home of the Foreign Minister in a Tokyo suburb. It was a large, well-wooded compound to which Subcommittee members traveled in separate unmarked cars to foil inquisitive reporters. On their side the Subcommittee comprised the Vice Foreign Minister (Shimoda had just become Ambassador to Washington and been replaced by Nobuhiko Ushiba), the Deputy Director of the Self-Defense Agency, and their top uniformed officer, I chaired the American contingent, which included representatives from CINCPAC in Hawaii and John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. It was a good all-day session, where we talked informally and deeply for the first time about the military importance of Okinawa, the implications of communist China's nuclear capability, the possibility of establishing an anti-ballistic missile defense system for Japan, and other issues.

The whole purpose of the committee was first to permit a regular dialogue, so that the Japanese could begin to understand our activities on Okinawa and Japan in depth and how they contributed to the overall security of the Far East. Soon I hoped it would expand into an instrument for discussing what the Japanese themselves thought necessary for their security and what they wanted the United States to contribute to it.

The basic procedural difficulty we encountered on the Subcommittee was that the Japanese government was simply not organized to deal with broad security issues. There were no reg-

ular committees in the Foreign Office or between the Foreign Office and the SDA, no reservoir of academic expertise, no habit of thinking this way. One Foreign Office official told me "We are so ignorant that we don't even know what questions to ask." Another procedural problem was that Japanese law made no provision for preserving Japan's military secrets, because according to Article IX it was not supposed to have any Japanese law did permit the government to protect American military secrets, but that did not cover everything the subcommittee considered. So Japanese staff work on some of the subjects we discussed was necessarily restricted. The subcommittee, which still meets regularly, has definitely contributed to the uncontroversial acceptance, now present among virtually all sectors of Japanese political opinion, that the American and Japanese governments have legitimate business consulting on security.

With the framework of consultation established, it was time to make progress on substance. Soon after arriving in October 1966 I requested Sato and Miki to put forth the Japanese government's basic position on Okinawa so we could start talking in earnest. This took time. They knew they wanted the island back, but they also had to resolve a fundamental question before settling on a bargaining strategy for obtaining that basic objective. If administrative rights over the Ryukyus reverted to Tokyo, should the United States retain its present rights to mount operations from the bases there without consulting the Japanese government? The Security Treaty prohibited such activities on the home island bases unless the government was first consulted. The question of freedom of use was especially sensitive while the Vietnam War continued, because Congress was not likely to approve any arrangement that undercut our forces there. And before Japan could decide what it wanted to do with Okinawa it had to formulate a larger view of the country's security needs. There were some more mundane but no less thorny problems raised by reversion: what financial arrangements should be made to convert the island's economy from dollars to yen and to compensate the United States for the public utilities and other civilian facilities built at United States expense that would be taken over by Japan?

The Japanese government was extremely reluctant to show its hand on these issues. It would not even advance an initial bargaining position because it had not gone through the difficult exercise of defining precisely what it wanted and did not want from reversion. But it could hardly stall indefinitely if it wanted

Okinawa back, so it tried the familiar gambit of reversing the procedure, asking us to state our minimum needs on Okinawa without indicating anything of its own minimum needs.

Foreign Minister Miki and I first discussed Okinawa in earnest on July 15, 1967, at a secret meeting held at the Hotel New Otani to avoid reporters. I was accompanied by the Counselor of the Political Section, Lewis Purnell, and my Special Assistant and interpreter, Jim Wickel. Miki brought along Ushiba and the two top people in the Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau, Fumihiko Togo and Sumio Edamura. Miki had asked for the meeting, he said, to request that I forward to Washington an Aide-Memoir the Japanese government had delivered to the Embassy already. It proposed two general steps: a joint United States-Japan effort to produce a formula that would permit a proper military role for the bases after reversion and agreement on interim measures to reduce the disparities between Okinawa and Japan in preparation for reversion. Miki said that the time for reversion had come and that our bases on Okinawa and their status now constituted the main question between our countries. The core of this question, he said, was "what are the requirements the United States would need as a minimum to provide defense capabilities for Japan and the area?"

I countered this view politely but firmly. I told him that the question was not what the minimum requirements of the United States Government were, but what Japan wanted in this area. In viewing East Asia in long-range terms, I said, the United States could not carry out a unilateral policy. The only policy that we could and would carry out was one that Japan supported, not one in which she merely acquiesced. Japan was the strongest and most powerful nation in this area and had to make up its own mind about what it wished to see in this part of the world, I stressed. Diplomacy could reveal what interests the two countries had in common, once each nation decided what its *own* interests were. First, Japan had to reach a decision on the military posture it wanted the United States to maintain in Japan and in the rest of Asia, and then we might find where we fit together on Okinawa.

From the American point of view, I told Miki, the basic issue raised by reversion was Okinawa's future effectiveness as a deterrent to aggression. Not just our nuclear weapons but our conventional forces on the island deterred China and North Korea from trying some aggressive maneuver that might otherwise tempt them. If our freedom of action on Okinawa was reduced,

this deterrent would be also. Thus Japan had to decide what level of deterrent it thought best, strictly from its own interests. We could evacuate Okinawa entirely if we had to, I said, but at a cost to our deterrent capacity. And given Japan's stability and the harmony of views between our two countries on most security issues, no alternative base site in the region was as good.

We could also agree to put conventional operations from the Okinawan bases under the same restrictions that governed our bases on the Japanese home islands, I said, with any action mounted directly against non-Japanese territory to require prior consultation with the Japanese government. But what if China were then to conduct a massive conventional invasion of Thailand or Laos? The Japanese government might then have to decide whether to permit the United States to mount air attacks on Chinese supply routes. It would have to take responsibility for whatever decision it made before its Asian neighbors. Thus reversion could easily increase, not decrease, the Japanese government's immersion in world politics and its vulnerability to attacks from the Opposition.

In my own mind I was hoping we could eventually conclude some arrangement permitting us freedom of action to use our Okinawan forces to defend Taiwan and Korea without prior consultation. But at this point with Miki I simply wanted to set the wheels of the Japanese government turning on the general question of the bases' conventional role after reversion.

As for nuclear weapons, many Japanese commentators had speculated that the United States would easily concede our right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa because they believed development of the Polaris submarine meant that land-based nuclear weapons were no longer essential. Miki raised this point, and I said: "Yes, we can do anything, but what is the effect?" Unleashing a Polaris attack was a drastic step that might easily entrain a spiraling series of responses and counter-responses that a smaller response with tactical nuclear weapons might not. A graduated deterrent was the most effective deterrent because it permitted us to respond at a level corresponding to the aggression. So Okinawa's nuclear weapons still had strategic importance.

Miki said several times more that Japan did not underestimate the importance of American forces in the Far East in all their variety, but even so the basic question was what were United States minimum requirements. I consequently repeated my conviction that "the broader aspects are more important. It is not

the minimum the United States can get along with, but rather what is the maximum which is desirable to both of us." The issue of Okinawa was well and truly joined.

To keep the ball rolling, I said I would report back to Washington and see what its views were, we also tentatively arranged another Security Subcommittee meeting for the beginning of August that would permit Miki and me to meet again after it and before he departed for the Washington Cabinet-level conference in September.

At this July 15 meeting Miki also questioned me on American plans for the Bonins, in line with a proposal in the Japanese government's Aide-Memoir for their early return. It was only "common sense to recognize a difference" between them and Okinawa, he said, noting that his government had not received any explanation from the United States about their military significance. Privately, I quite agreed with him that the Bonins had minimal security value, but now was not the time to concede that point. First I had to prepare the soil at USFI, CINCPAC, and in Washington to accept gracefully the idea of returning the islands, which would take some work. Whatever arrangements we established for the Bonins would set a very firm precedent for Okinawa, so we had to take care over the fine print, especially on getting compensation for facilities taken over by the Japanese government and guaranteeing the future economic rights of the islanders whose welfare we now formally represented. By maintaining a tough facade on the Bonins we might induce some concessions from Japan that would be valuable on Okinawa. And the timing was very tricky. If we hastened the return of the Bonins, pressure from the Japanese public and government in favor of Okinawa's reversion might increase rather than decrease, thus diminishing our room to maneuver.

By themselves, the Bonins boated very little to warrant so much interest. A collection of tiny outcroppings in the Pacific midway between Japan and the Marianas, their name is a derivative of the Japanese term "Bu-nin," literally "empty of men." The largest, Chichijima (meaning "Father Island,") is less than ten miles square, other "major" links in the chain include Ha-

\*For a very interesting description of the Bonins' past, see Timothy Head and Gary An Daws, "The Bonins-Isles of Contentment," *American Heritage* February, 1968.

hajima (Mother Island) and Iwo Jima, the largest in a cluster of volcanic islands considerably south of Chichijima and Hahajima. The Bonins were claimed successively by Britain, America and Japan, but the most enduring claim to ownership was established by five deckhands (including two Americans eager for an easier life) who settled on Chichijima with Hawaiian laborers and "wives," of whom each had several, in 1830. The soil was good, but whatever harmony could be established amidst the settlers' incessant feuds was broken by frequent visits from whaling ships, whose crews stole whatever they could get their hands on. In 1853 Commodore Perry's Black Fleet, en route to Japan, called at Chichijima and appointed Nathaniel Savory, one of the original settlers, resident United States agent. Perry also bought a plot of Savory's land as a future coaling station for the Navy's Pacific fleet, a move well ahead of its time. But Meiji Japan, waking from isolation, decided to preempt Perry's foresight. In 1862 a Japanese expedition convinced Savory and the other islanders to accept Japanese sovereignty, later that year a group of Japanese settlers arrived to substantiate the claim. The two communities did not mix. In 1876 Japan formally annexed the islands, where a growing number of Japanese settlers earned a living by supplying visiting whaling ships and hunting the abundant population of seals and turtles.

As Japanese militarism gathered strength in the 1920s and 1930s, the Bonins took on strategic importance. All non-Japanese except the descendants of the original settlers were excluded. Finally the civilian population was evacuated to Tokyo and Yokohama in 1944, including the American-surgamed settlers, who were assigned Japanese names and expected to be the Emperor's loyal subjects.

The Japanese made Chichijima into a major supply base and island fortress. But Allied planners in charge of the "island-hopping" campaign across the Pacific focused their attention on Iwo Jima, which was less fortified and more suitable for constructing an airfield that could accept disabled bombers returning from raids on Japan. American forces invaded the island February 19, 1945. The small, ugly splotch of lava became a scene of carnage, with 7,000 Americans and an estimated 120,000 Japanese dead before we took it on March 26. The 6th Marine Division established a memorial atop Iwo Jima's Mount Suribachi, which had the distinction of being the only place in the world besides the United States Capitol where the American flag flew twenty-four hours a day.

Shortly after I became Consul in Yokohama in 1945, a group of the American-surnamed Bonin islanders approached me requesting their return to Chichijima. They claimed to be American citizens, given names like Washington and Savory, and the record of persecution they had suffered in Japan during the war, I understood why they thought so. However, most of them were third-generation Boninatics who had intermarried with Japanese, spoke English poorly if at all, and had very tenuous ties with the United States. Nevertheless, the group was small and its desire was straightforward. I discussed their case with SCAP and, in October 1946, arranged for the return of about 130 American-surnamed islanders to Chichijima.

Under the indulgent eye of the United States Navy, which established a small base on Chichijima, the settlers returned to an easy life. They lived in Navy Quonset huts and ate Navy food, their children attended the Admiral Arthur W. Radford School, they went to Navy hospitals on Guam, and paid no taxes. Nevertheless, they married mostly Japanese from the home island, and no one really knew what their citizenship was. The islanders' numbers had increased to about 250 by the time I became Ambassador, and one of the problems we now faced was protecting the inhabitants' future under Japanese rule, which would probably be more spartan than the United States Navy's and would certainly not educate their children in English. Former Japanese settlers evacuated during the war would also be free to return after reversion, as many wanted to, meaning more competition for the resources available. Sentiment among the islanders seemed to favor some sort of American citizenship, but this the Japanese government would doubtless reject.

The islanders' future status was a comparatively small problem, however, easily solved if the major obstacle to full Japanese sovereignty was swept away. Navy resistance. After my July 15 meeting with Miki, I started communicating with Washington frequently to start the wheels turning. The Navy's basic position was that we should not give up anything anywhere that might someday possibly be useful. If we were to lose Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Navy argued, the Bonins would be an important reserve. I thought this was nonsense. If we were driven from the rest of the Pacific, we certainly could not hold the Bonins or mount a worthwhile counteroffensive from this insignificant cluster of rocks. My position had the advantage of being logical, and it gained headway. The Navy was making very

little use of the islands anyway, so its arguments seemed a little pale. Our total contingent there numbered about sixty-five.

The final sticking point with the military was the future of Iwo Jima. The famous picture of the Marines planting the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, and the dreadful toll the invasion exacted, made the island an important symbol to many Americans, not just the military. Its potential return to Japanese control might spark an emotional outcry that could jeopardize the whole Bonin settlement. My initial suggestion to Washington was that we ask the Japanese government to designate the whole island of Iwo Jima as a military base under the 1960 Security Treaty, which would permit us to retain effective control of the Mount Suribachi memorial and its twenty-four hour flag.

After the July 15 meeting with Miki on Okinawa and the Bonins, both governments went into high gear preparing for the September joint meeting of Japanese and American Cabinet ministers at which Miki would meet Rusk, as a prelude to the crucial November summit between Sato and LBJ. Neither government seriously doubted that reversion would eventually be accomplished, but the crucial questions were how fast and under what conditions. Public opinion in Japan, led by the Opposition parties, was moving towards something of a national consensus on Okinawa that was unfavorable to American interests. It favored immediate reversion under an agreement that would permit the bases to continue, but without nuclear weapons and under considerable restrictions as to how and when their conventional forces could be employed. There were some indications that summer of 1967 that even the orthodox Marxist Japan Socialist Party was moving towards that view.

Sato's own detailed views on Okinawan reversion were by no means explicit, but he wanted the bases to continue in an effective form, and this trend in public opinion disturbed him. He tried to moderate rising public emotionalism about Okinawa, dampening expectations of the island's early return and stressing the serious security considerations raised by reversion. He recognized that the Japanese people had no experience in forming judgments on security matters and needed time to come to terms with the strategic realities from which Article IX and the American base structure had shielded them since the Occupation. He needed to buy that time, during which this larger strategic picture could be explained to the public and could penetrate its attitudes, and to succeed in this approach he needed American cooperation

This was in our interest as well, for if he appeared to be making no progress whatever in getting Okinawa back, his government might well be replaced by a more radical one, with more intransigent attitudes on the whole range of questions between the United States and Japan

Within the Ryukyus themselves, and at Japanese government urging, we had been making occasional concessions to make the pressure for reversion manageable. After heavy agitation from Okinawan fishermen, we permitted them to replace the American flag flown over their vessels with a new one that incorporated the Japanese rising sun. Japanese economic assistance to the islands had been permitted to the tune of \$28 million, double that of the United States. We had also allowed Japan Air Lines to start an inter-island air service.

In preparation for the Miki-Rusk and Sato-LBJ meetings, the embassy devised some additional interim measures that we might institute to reduce disparities between life on Okinawa and Japan proper while calming pressures for immediate reversion. These measures included permitting direct popular election of the Ryukyuan government's Chief Executive, and creating a tri-lateral United States-Japan-Ryukyuan committee to advise the High Commissioner on ways of smoothing the transition between American and Japanese administration. But we did not want to unveil these proposals just yet.

Miki came to Washington in September with instructions from Sato to scout out our irreducible minimum requirements on Okinawa while revealing as little as possible of the Japanese position. Sato wanted to retain maximum flexibility in his discussions with President Johnson, his advisors also wanted to make sure that the ambitious Miki did not try to steal Sato's thunder by committing Japan to an Okinawan settlement prematurely. Since we could always make concessions at the Sato summit if we wanted to, our strategy with Miki, worked out in meetings I had with Rusk and Defense Secretary McNamara, was to take a very hard line emphasizing the importance of the Okinawan bases to our mutual security and indicating no willingness whatever to concede our present rights to store nuclear weapons or use the bases freely.

Secretary McNamara told me that he was entirely prepared to turn over Okinawa to Japanese administration, but there was no possibility of abandoning our bases there. The real issue was whether we would accept the same restrictions on them that governed our bases on Japan proper under the 1960 Security

Treaty, namely, giving up our right to store nuclear weapons and engage in combat operations against other areas of the Far East without "prior consultation." McNamara argued that since we would never again fight a war in Asia without Japanese support, "homeland-level" restrictions on the Okinawan bases would not seriously compromise our interests. I thought this approach had merit, but more time and study was required before it became our bottom line position. We agreed that for the time being the Japanese should not know that we were even thinking of conceding these things. Although we might not now want to store nuclear weapons on the island or mount operations elsewhere without prior consultation, the right to do so in a crisis might be worth retaining. In any event, nuclear weapons storage and freedom of use were good bargaining chips that we did not want to give away prematurely. So when Miki met McNamara, the Defense Secretary took a very firm stance on the necessity of our retaining freedom of use and nuclear weapons storage rights on Okinawa.

Secretary Rusk took an equally hard line when he invited Miki to lunch and a long, private meeting on Saturday, September 16, which I attended. Miki emphasized how crucial an agreement on Okinawa was to the survival of the Sato government. Rusk countered by saying that there were two levels on which Okinawan reversion could be discussed: the requirements of Japanese popular opinion, and the deepest security needs and commitments of our two countries. The United States had pledged 100 million lives in the first hour of war to protect Japan, he said. With the war in Vietnam continuing and a newly nuclear China in the throes of a chaotic cultural revolution, the American people would have great difficulty understanding any effort by Japan to deny us the facilities we needed to protect Japan. We had no desire to administer Okinawa permanently. We understood the special importance the Sato government placed on reversion and Japan's nuclear sensitivities. But American soldiers could not be made mercenaries for Japan, Rusk stressed, if we had a common purpose, then Japan had to contribute to accomplishing it. In any event, Rusk said we were afraid that the upcoming 1968 presidential elections would prevent the United States from giving any firm commitments on the Ryukyus until 1969 at the earliest.

To soften the blow of this uncompromising presentation, Rusk offered a crucial palliative useful to both sides: we would help the Sato government buy time on reversion with the Operation and the Okinawans themselves. One such measure would

be the creation of the United States-Japan-Ryukyus commission to devise ways of reducing social and economic differences between Okinawa and Japan. Rusk also said the United States could indicate in the communiqué following the upcoming Sato-LBJ meeting that the United States agreed to reversion in principle and would implement it once Japan and the United States had concluded terms that would not interfere with the bases' security role. He also led Miki to understand that the Bonins would pose no insuperable problems for us, as long as Japan did not use their return to lever us on Okinawa, and agreed to an acceptable formula for Iwo Jima.

In fact, it was the Bonins on which the most substantial progress was made during Miki's visit to Washington, though he was unaware of it at the time. I had several private meetings with members of the Joint Chiefs, as well as with McNamara and Rusk, and attended a full National Security Council Meeting with the President. The Navy was still advancing its view that the Bonins would be crucial in case we were driven from the rest of the Far East, but the rest of the Joint Chiefs and the civilian officials at Defense, including Secretary McNamara, saw State's position, and I left Washington fairly certain that we would be able to announce the return of the Bonins during Sato's visit in November.

The other Japanese ministers present in Washington spent their three days discussing economic issues with their American counterparts, both one-on-one and in plenary sessions that Secretary Rusk and I attended. We pressed them to liberalize trade and especially investment policies, suggested that they penetrate European markets as well as ours, and encouraged them to contribute more to economic development in Southeast Asia. Since we bore a disproportionate share of the cost of maintaining military security in Asia, we thought Japan could contribute to our common purpose in a way that suited its basic pacifism by helping the struggling countries around China toward stability and prosperity. We especially wanted Tokyo to match our initial contribution of \$200 million to the new Asian Development Bank's \$1 billion capitalization, instead of the \$100 million it had already pledged. The Bonin and Ryukyu negotiations gave us some leverage in this area.

The Japanese ministers, for their part, complained about "buy American" sentiment in Congress and gave no encouragement to our requests. Japan was facing a spate of balance-of-payment deficits of its own as its growing economy sucked in imports, and the population was demanding that the government

spend more on providing a better quality of life, especially in the crowded and smoggy cities. Thus the Japanese ministers were skittish about taking on major regional economic responsibilities for Southeast Asia. Both sides' positions on these economic issues were pretty much boilerplate, but the informal talks between counterparts allowed for some very frank dialogue that gave each side an excellent feel for the problems of the other.

En route back to Tokyo I stopped in Honolulu to brief Admiral Felt about our sessions with Miki and the progress of Washington's thinking on Okinawa and the Bonins. Back in Japan, I met several times with Miki and Sato to prepare for the summit. We invoked a normal if odd-seeming diplomatic technique, focusing on hammering out the exact language of the joint communiqué to be issued at the end of the summit. I expressed the possibility that the Bonins could be returned at the summit, but made no promises. I said the President would have to decide himself, and the terms of return might include designating all of Iwo Jima as a military base under the Security Treaty. Miki argued that this would negate everything that Washington would gain from returning the islands. He also pressed repeatedly for communiqué language that would indicate that reversion of the Ryukyus would occur at the "earliest possible date," but on this subject I was adamant. I said we would consider a phrasing that would signal that reversion was in process and that we would institute the interim measures to reduce economic and social differences between the Ryukyus and Japan. But specifying a date or asserting that Japanese control would occur "as soon as possible" would put heavy pressure on both countries to reach an agreement faster than either could manage.

As the date of departure for the summit neared, Miki grew increasingly restive. He was understandably disturbed that we might not return Iwo Jima with the rest of the Bonins, and that we refused to give him a specific date for Okinawa's return that he (and Sato) could parade before the electorate. He became so pessimistic about what the summit could accomplish, in fact, that he began to seek some way of avoiding attending it. Several times he said to me: "You know, I wonder whether it is really necessary for me to go?" I gave him no encouragement in this direction whatever, believing that divisions between him and the Prime Minister worked contrary to our interests. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister's constant besegement by reporters and photographers made it impossible for me to have a long talk with him